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This paper characterizes the optimal coupon strategy for a 
monopolistic manufacturer in the presence of Internet. The 
literature on coupon strategies has examined the price 
discrimination function of regular coupons (those issued off 
the Internet) under the assumption of fu ll consumer 
awareness for the product; see Gerstner and Hess (1991, 
1995). This paper allows the manufacturer to issue both 
regular and e-coupons in a marketing environment where 
some potential buyers are unaware of the product. We show 
that e-coupons perform a fundamentally different function 
than regular coupons: By issuing some properly designed 
e-coupons to a small number of consumers on the net, the 
manufacturer may benefit greatly from free advertising 
which raises the consumer awareness for the product. This 
happens because the e-coupons may be forwarded to the 
associates of the early receivers under the latter’s discretion. 
We distinguish two levels of redemption costs, the costs of 
acquiring a coupon, and the costs of carrying the coupon till 
redemp tion. We show that (1) if consumers have similar 
carrying costs, then an e-coupon and a regular coupon 
should be issued, which perform respectively the advertising 
and promotion functions; (2) If consumers have similar 
acquisition costs but very different carrying costs, and if 
there are many low-valuation consumers, then the 
manufacturer should issue just one e-coupon which performs 
the dual functions of advertising and promotion; (3) If 
consumers’ acquisition and carrying costs are both similar, 
and if there are few low-valuation consumers, then again an 
e-coupon and a regular coupon should be issued, which 
perform respectively the advertising and promotion 
functions, but in this case the face value of the e-coupon 
must be much higher than that in case (1). Despite the merits 
of e-coupons, we find that the issuance of e-coupons may 
reduce the benefits of regular coupons and/or aggravate the 
downstream channel members’ incentive problems. Our 
results are consistent with recent empirical facts.  
Keywords: Viral Marketing, E-coupons, Screening, 





The emergence of Internet has drastically changed the way 
information is transmitted. Although advertising expenditure 
has fallen in the past decade, it has been documented that 
online advertising has become increasingly important, and 
the spending on online advertising in the United States will 
reach $22 billion by 2004, more than triple the amount in 
1999; see Dreazen (1999)[2]. Among the several forms of 
online advertising, viral messages are found to be most 
effective; see Zimmerman (2001), White (2001) and Kelly 
(2000). 1 [16][15][7] Of particular importance are the 
                                                 
1 For example, Zimmerman (2001) finds that viral messages 
are much more effective than banner ads.  
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electronic coupons, which spread the viral messages by 
carrying rewards for the receivers; see Hassell (1999)[6]. 
According to a survey conducted by NPD Online Research, 
currently 23% of Internet users have used e-coupons when 
making a purchase, and 87% say they plan to use online 
coupons in the future (Direct Marketing, 1999)[17]. A 
consumer may obtain e-coupons at several well-known web 
sites, among which the top three are Coolsavings.com, 
which was visited by 51 percent of e-coupons acquirers, 
followed by Valupage.com, 48 percent, and Mypoints.com, 
30 percent; see Liddle (2000)[9]. Alternatively, corporations 
can send e-coupons to randomly selected consumers via 
electronic mail. In Taiwan, famous restaurants like the 
Brasseries at Grand Formosa Regent Taipei and King Join 
send their e-coupons to consumers constantly. In most cases, 
these e-coupons can be re-produced and transferred from 
one consumer to another.  
 
Despite the prevalence of e-coupons, little has been known 
regarding how e-coupons may be combined with regular 
coupons (conventional coupons) to enhance the functions 
they perform, or more generally how pull promotion 
instruments may be optimally designed to raise a 
manufacturer’s profits in the presence of Internet. The 
purpose of this paper is to characterize a manufacturer’s 
optimal coupon strategy in the presence of Internet. 
Specifically, we address the following issues:  
1. When should a manufacturer issue an e-coupon? When 
should he issue a regular coupon?  
2. What functions do e-coupons and regular coupons 
respectively perform?  
3. How to determine the face value and expiration date of an 
e-coupon?  
4. Why do some e-coupons have higher redemption rates 
than others? Should the manufacturer prefer a high or a 
low redemption rate?  
5. Does the use of e-coupons marginally enhance or reduce 
the benefits of regular coupons?  
6. Are e-coupons useful for alleviating downstream channel 
members’ incentive problems, just like regular coupons?  
 
The literature on coupon strategies has focused on the 
screening role of regular coupons. Gerstner and Hess (1991), 
for example, show that regular coupons can be used to price 
discriminate consumers if the latter’s valuations for the 
product and redemption costs for the coupons are positively 
correlated; see also Narasimhan (1984)[12]. Gerstner and 
Hess (1995)[4] show that, by inducing only low-valuation 
consumers to use a regular coupon, the double mark-up 
problem that arises in a distribution channel can be 
alleviated, because with the regular coupon the 
low-valuation consumers’ net valuation for the product gets 
closer to that of the high-valuation consumers. This 
literature has assumed full consumer awareness; that is, the 
size of potential buyers is independent of the firm’s coupon 
strategy. 
 
The point of departure of this paper is the observation that 
for consumers forwarding an e-coupon to a friend is less 
costly than transferring a regular coupon to an associate. 
Since the cost of forwarding an e-coupon is low, the 
manufacturer may save some costs by issuing a coupon via 
the net, and he may also get (nearly) free advertising if an 
e-coupon receiver can be induced to forward the e-coupon to 
his associates. The latter would be possible if consumers 
take their associates’ utilities into account and if the face 
value of the e-coupon is sufficiently high: the only reason 
that an e-coupon receiver wants to forward the e-coupon to 
his associates is because he expects the latter to benefit from 
the e-coupon. On the other hand, the manufacturer must also 
benefit from the issuance of an e-coupon. This requires that 
the e-coupon perform either the function of price 
discrimination, or other functions. To develop a theory of 
e-coupons, we therefore assume that there are consumers 
unaware of the product. We then apply a game-theoretic 
model to identify the occasions where the e-coupon 
performs only the function of awareness enhancement, and 
where it also performs the function of price discrimination. 
Thus the marketing environment we will be studying differs 
from that of Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] in two 
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ways: the presence of Internet, and the presence of 
consumers who are unaware of the product.  
 
A second observation that motivates the subsequent analysis 
is that, although consumers must spend considerable costs to 
locate a regular coupon, the acquisition costs of e-coupons 
are generally lower. Since we are interested in the nature of 
e-coupons as viral messages (carrying rewards), we shall 
focus on the e-coupons that are sent out by the manufacturer, 
and leave those e-coupons one can download from web sites 
out of the picture. 2 In this case, e-coupons may be passively 
received, but they cannot be actively acquired. A number of 
randomly reached consumers will end up with an e-coupon, 
and for these consumers the acquisition costs are zero. 
Nonetheless, these e-coupon receivers must decide whether 
or not to keep the e-coupon for later redemption. We 
recognize that carrying a coupon till redemption can also be 
costly. Thus, in our model the redemption costs in Gerstner 
and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] are explicitly divided into two 
parts, the acquisition costs and the carrying costs, and our 
main results show that the functions e-coupons may perform 
crucially depend on consumers’ variations in these two 
costs.  
 
Under the assumptions that the e-coupon can be transferred 
back and forth sufficiently fast before transactions take place, 
and that a consumer unaware of the product turns himself 
into an aware consumer upon receiving the e-coupon, this 
paper generates the following results. First, if consumers’ 
redemption costs consist mainly of acquisition costs, and if 
the costs of issuing e-coupons and regular coupons are both 
reasonably low, then the manufacturer should first issue one 
e-coupon and then one regular coupon, and the two coupons 
perform respectively the advertising and screening functions. 
The intuition of this result is as follows. Under the 
assump tion that the e-coupon can be transferred between 
                                                 
2 In fact, an alternative interpretation of our model allows us 
to also cover the case where e-coupons are first acquired at 
those web sites by consumers constantly surfing on the net, 
and then re-produced and forwarded to the associates of 
these early receivers. See footnote 12. 
consumers sufficiently fast, nearly all consumers will 
receive the e-coupon before transactions take place. Issuing 
the e-coupon is efficient because it raises the number of 
aware consumers, but it does not change the ratio of 
high-valuation to low-valuation consumers. As a 
consequence, the optimal regular coupon in the presence of 
the optimal e-coupon is just the optimal regular coupon in 
the absence of e-coupons, a result we refer to as a 
“separability”. The optimal e-coupon is purely advertising, 
in the sense that it provides an inexpensive instrument for 
the manufacturer to raise consumer awareness. In fact, all 
feasible e-coupons fail the price discrimination function in 
the current case and must be purely advertising, because as 
far as e-coupons are concerned, any differential in 
acquisition costs across consumers disappears.  
 
Second, suppose that consumers’ redemption costs consist 
mainly of carrying costs. In this case, the manufacturer 
should issue just one e-coupon if (1) consumers’ carrying 
costs are very different, and (2) there are sufficiently many 
low-valuation consumers. If these conditions fail, then the 
manufacturer should again issue one e-coupon and one 
regular coupon. The idea is that, for the manufacturer to give 
up the regular coupon, the e-coupon must also perform the 
function of price discrimination. This means that only 
low-valuation consumers should be induced to carry and 
redeem the e-coupon. The problem with this coupon strategy 
is that an e-coupon receiver may refuse to forward the 
e-coupon to his associates. This could happen if the receiver 
believes that his associates are likely to be high-valuation 
consumers, or if the face value of the e-coupon is too low to 
create a sufficient benefit for his associates. Condition (2) 
ensures that a receiver believes that his associates are likely 
to be low-valuation consumers, and condition (1) ensures 
that the face value of e-coupon can be much higher than the 
low-valuation consumers’ redemption costs. When these 
conditions fail, the e-coupon can not perform the screening 
function. The manufacturer has to run a regular coupon 
subsequently to price discriminate consumers. The face 
value of the e-coupon in this case must be higher than in the 
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previous case where consumers’ redemption costs for 
coupons consist mainly of the acquisition costs. This 
happens because when condition (1) fails, essentially either 
all consumers or no consumers want to redeem the e-coupon. 
To induce an e-coupon receiver to forward the e-coupon to 
his associates, the face value must be sufficiently high so 
that even the high-valuation consumers are willing to carry 
the e-coupon.  
 
Our third result is that, despite the merits of e-coupons, the 
use of e-coupons may reduce the benefits of regular coupons 
and/or aggravate the downstream members’ incentive 
problems in a distribution channel, if the e-coupon may not 
be transferred sufficiently fast before transactions take place. 
In this case, the gains resulting from the e-coupons must be 
traded off against the costs. The intuition is roughly as 
follows. First consider a vertically integrated channel. At the 
time transactions take place, due to imperfect forwarding of 
the e-coupon, the manufacturer is generally faced with four 
classes of consumers: the highs with the e-coupon, the lows 
with the e-coupon, the highs without the e-coupon, and the 
lows without the e-coupon. A consumer with the e-coupon 
has a higher valuation for the product than his counterpart 
without the e-coupon. Thus the presence of consumers with 
the e-coupon discourages the manufacturer from serving the 
lows without the e-coupon (these are the consumers with the 
lowest valuation for the product). This implies that the 
manufacturer’s incentives of running a regular coupon is 
also reduced. To see this, note that a regular coupon has 
value because only the low-valuation consumers will redeem 
it, but in the current case, the e-coupon receivers tend to 
have high valuations for the product, and given that they 
have spent the carrying costs for the e-coupon, they do not 
mind carrying the regular coupon (the carrying costs are 
essentially fixed costs). Thus the presence of the e-coupon 
makes a subsequent regular coupon less effective as a price 
discrimination device. A similar reasoning applies when 
there is an independent retailer in the distribution channel. 
The e-coupon discourages the retailer from serving the lows 
without the e-coupon, and if the manufacturer insists on 
serving all consumers, he must offer more trade promotions 
to the retailer, so that the retailer will be better off in the 
presence of the e-coupon.  
 
Our theory is consistent with recent empirical facts. For 
example, our third result implies an inverse relationship 
between the number of e-coupons and the number of regular 
coupons issued, which is consistent with the findings of 
Liebeskind (2000)[10]. Our prediction that, unlike those of 
regular coupons, the redemption rates of e-coupons are 
either very high or very low is consistent with the recent 
experiences of Grand Formosa Regent Taipei and King Join 
in Taiwan. That the manufacturer in many cases issues both 
e-coupons and regular coupons is consistent with the report 
of Editor and Publisher.3 A variant of the model shows that 
it may also be optimal for the manufacturer to issue an 
e-coupon that is never redeemed. This result is consistent 
with some real cases in Taiwan, mostly about soft drinks and 
instant noodles, where e-coupons were extensively sent out 
to reach a large number of consumers, and yet the 
redemption rates were extremely low; see also our 
discussions in section 3.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2, we lay out the basic model where a vertically 
integrated distribution channel must choose an e-coupon and 
regular coupon strategy to optimally raise consumers 
awareness and optimally price discriminate consumers. In 
section 3, we solve the equilibrium of the model in two polar 
cases, the case where acquiring coupons is costless and the 
case where carrying coupons is costless. These polar cases 
best demonstrate our argument that e-coupons and regular 
coupons perform essentially different functions. The general 
model is solved in section 4, where we deliver our main 
results and give interpretations. In sections 3 and 4, we also 
discuss the several crucial assumptions adopted in the model, 
and consider the effects of relaxing them. Two new results 
are obtained after we allow imperfect forwarding of 
                                                 
3 See the article entitled, “Web coupons clip,” on page 32 of 
Editor and Publisher, volume 32, 1999. 
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e-coupons. We conclude in section 5, where we discuss 
possible extensions along this line of research.  
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
Consider a monopolistic manufacturer who costlessly 
produces and sells a product to a large number of 
consumers.4 5 The population of consumers is normalized to 
one, and a fraction p of consumers have become aware of 
the product, where 1³p³0. A consumer who is aware 
(respectively, unaware) of the product will be referred to as 
an “aware consumer” (respectively, “unaware consumer”), 
and an aware consumer’s reservation price for the product 
can either be V or v, where V>v>0. Let a be the fraction of 
the aware consumers with valuation V (referred to as 
“high-valuation consumers” hereafter), where 1³a³0. An 
unaware consumer has no well-defined reservation price, but 
we can without loss of generality take it to be zero.  
 
For simplicity, assume that all consumers have email 
accounts so that an aware consumer has the same chance of 
receiving an e-coupon as an unaware consumer does. 
Moreover, assume that each consumer has exactly one other 
consumer as his associate (more generally, this could be a 
friend, a relative, a colleague, and so forth). We assume that 
a consumer seeks to maximize the sum of his consumer 
surplus and his associate’s consumer surplus. This 
assumption intends to substantiate the idea that a consumer 
who receives an e-coupon will forward it to his associate if 
and only if the benefit his associate derives from the 
e-coupon is expected to exceed the small cost d>0 he must 
                                                 
4 Throughout this article we assume that the distribution 
channel is vertically integrated. In section 3.4 we discuss 
how our main results may be affected by the presence of an 
independent retailer.  
5 We shall apply the law of large numbers to estimate the 
fraction of consumers who ultimately own an e-coupon, if 
initially only a small fraction l of consumers are reached by 
the coupon. To this end, we must assume a large number of 
consumers; see equation (2.1) below. The assumption of 
costless production is for simplicity, and immaterial.  
incur when forwarding the e-coupon. 6  Because the 
consumer’s objective function is additive, his decision 
regarding whether the received e-coupon should be 
forwarded to his associate is independent of his own 
valuation for the product. This greatly simplifies the 
subsequent analysis. As for the regular coupons, we assume 
that transferring a regular coupon to an associate is 
prohibitively costly.  
 
An important assumption that will be maintained throughout 
this article is that an unaware consumer is transformed into 
an aware consumer immediately after he is reached by an 
e-coupon. We have in mind two arguments that support this 
assumption. First, unlike other advertising activities, the 
message delivered by an e-coupon comes with a benefit for 
the receiver. 7  Second, the receiver is inclined to pay 
attention to a message forwarded by an associate, for it 
represents a reliable piece of opinion.8 On the other hand, a 
regular coupon may also deliver a message with a benefit to 
unaware consumers, but it incurs higher costs to do so, and 
since the message is less reliable, the receiver may choose to 
disregard it.9 More specifically, we assume that sending an 
e-coupon to a fraction l of consumers on the net incurs a 
cost E(l), where E(l)=kl if l³l0 >0 and E(l)= kl0 if l<l0. 
On the other hand sending a regular coupon to a fraction l 
of consumers off the net incurs a cost T(l)=K0+Kl, where 
K0>0,  K>k>0.
10   
                                                 
6 The parameter d will subsequently be used to gauge the 
relative importance of high-valuation and low-valuation 
consumers.  
7  Proctor and Gamble argues forcefully that successful 
on-line advertising must exhibit two R’s: the richness of 
presentation and sufficient reward to consumers; see Hassell 
(1999).  
8 Erin Kelly (2000) wrote, “Marketing messages spread like 
the flu, passed by word of mouth from one friend to another 
to five more, until there is a full-blown epidemic.”   
9 In any case, money-saving coupons, if they can reach 
consumers, are useful for raising brand awareness; see for 
example Mettra (2000)[12].  
10  According Credit World 87[19], web sites have the 
advantage of capturing customer data. Some sites have been 
using “push” technology to email specific information to 
specific customers. Here, the threshold level l0 may stand 
for a group of customers of whom the manufacturer has 
collected useful data (by spending the cost kl0 ). An 
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In this paper, we distinguish two levels of redemption costs, 
the acquisition costs and the carrying costs. The acquisition 
costs refer to the costs that one must incur to obtain a 
coupon. For regular coupons, we assume that the acquisition 
costs for high-valuation and low-valuation consumers are 
respectively A and 0, where A>0. We shall assume that the 
acquisition costs for regular coupons are fixed costs, 
representing mainly the costs of time spent on the search of 
the coupons. We have in mind the situation where in case 
there are multiple regular coupons issued by the 
manufacturer, a consumer can spend a one-time cost to 
locate all these coupons. 11   The acquisition costs for 
e-coupons are quite different. For those who received 
e-coupons from the manufacturer or their associates, the 
acquisition costs are zero, and for those who did not, the 
acquisition costs are infinity (meaning that e-coupons may 
only be passively received). On the other hand, the carrying 
costs refer to the costs of carrying the coupon till redemption. 
These may include the storage costs and the mental costs 
that one may incur when he has to remind himself to bring 
the coupon along when he visits the manufacturer’s store. 
We assume that the carrying costs are fixed costs, in the 
sense that once a consumer carries an e-coupon, say, then the 
marginal cost of carrying an additional regular coupon is 
zero. The (fixed) carrying costs for high-valuation and 
low-valuation consumers are respectively C and c, where 
C>c³0. Following Gerstner and Hess (1995), we have 
assumed A>0 and C>c ³0 so that regular coupons may be 
used to price discriminate consumers and alleviate an 
independent dealer’s incentive problems. By abusing the 
terminology slightly, we call a coupon “promotional” if it 
                                                                                   
alternative interpretation is that the manufacturer spends a 
cost kl0  to operate a web-site which offers e-coupons to 
the surfers on the net, and the surfers have population l0. 
11 This assumption is crucial, for if the acquisition costs are 
variable costs, one will reach the conclusion that in the 
context of Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995), for example, the 
manufacturer should keep issuing new coupons until the 
highs have zero consumer surplus. One way to justify the 
optimality of the single-coupon strategy in Gerstner and 
Hess (1991, 1995) is to assume that consumers have fixed 
acquisition costs for regular coupons.   
performs the function of price discrimination, and  
“advertising” if it helps to enhance consumer awareness for 
the product.12  
 
The interactions between the manufacturer and the 
consumers are modeled as an extensive game, which 
proceeds as follows. At first, the manufacturer posts the 
product price and chooses an e-coupon strategy.13 At this 
time, the manufacturer must choose a price p, specify the 
face value h for the e-coupon, and determine the fraction l 
of consumers to be reached by the e-coupon initially, with a 
cost E(l) spent. Then, all consumers learn the price posted 
by the manufacturer, and those who received an e-coupon 
must make two decisions: whether to carry the e-coupon till 
the shopping day, and whether to forward the e-coupon to 
their associates. We assume that all consumers will visit the 
manufacturer’s store on the same day. A consumer who 
received an e-coupon will carry it till the shopping day if 
and only if he will buy the product on the shopping day, and 
moreover, the carrying cost (which is a fixed cost) of the 
e-coupon is lower than the sum of the face values of the 
e-coupon and of the regular coupon that he thinks the 
manufacturer will issue next. Such a consumer will forward 
the e-coupon to his associate if and only if he expects his 
associate to derive an utility from the e-coupon higher than 
the cost d>0 that he must bear to forward the e-coupon. We 
assume that an e-coupon receiver does not know how many 
other consumers have received the e-coupon before him, nor 
does he know if his associate has received the e-coupon 
(except for the case where he has personally forwarded the 
e-coupon to his associate earlier), and moreover, that he, 
                                                 
12 Also, the two terms price discrimination and screening 
will be interchangeably used.  
13 Following the above fixed acquisition and carrying costs 
assumption, the manufacturer will issue at most one 
e-coupon and one regular coupon. We shall also assume that 
a consumer is limited to present at most one e-coupon and 
one regular coupon for each purchase. This seems to be the 
standard practice nowadays; to implement this policy 
Domino’s asks its clients to show personal ID’s. The latter 
assumption can be shown to be optimal indeed, but we 
choose to post it as an assumption to simplify the subsequent 
analysis.  
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having one associate only, will ignore the e-coupon the 
second time he sees it. Suppose that an e-coupon can be 
forwarded n times before the shopping day, where n is 
exogenous. Given l, if h is such that consumers are willing 
to forward the e-coupon to their associates, then ultimately 
the fraction of consumers who received the e-coupon will be 
xn, where x0=l, x1 =2l-l2, and for all n³2,  
 
 xn=xn-1+(xn-1-xn-2)(1-xn-1).            (2.1) 
 
Lemma 2.1 below shows that xn will approach 1 as n tends 
to infinity.14 Since this is true for any l>0, the optimal 
e-coupon which induces forwarding must specify the 
minimum l0. As l0 goes to zero, the expenditure kl0 goes to 
zero also, this demonstrates the idea that e-coupons can 
serve as inexpensive on-line advertising instruments, as long 
as inducing forwarding is no problem.  
 
After the e-coupon receivers’ decisions, 15  the game 
continues with the manufacturer issuing a regular coupon. 
At this time, two things matter. First, some originally 
unaware consumers may have become aware of the product, 
and hence the population of aware consumers may rise. 
Second, those consumers who have carried the e-coupon 
essentially have higher valuations for the product. The 
manufacturer’s problem at this time is similar to that treated 
in Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4], except that the 
price has been determined at the first stage of the game. The 
manufacturer may find it beneficial to mail his regular 
coupon to some randomly selected consumers in an effort to 
raise consumer awareness, which is possible in particular if 
no actions have been taken in earlier stages to enhance 
                                                 
14 There are x0 =l initially reached consumers, who forward 
the e-coupon to l other consumers, where with probability 
(1- x0) a new receiver has not obtained the e-coupon before. 
We rely on the law of large numbers to assert that x1=2l-l2 
holds approximately. Now only the new receivers (-x0 +x1) 
will forward the e-coupon, and this time with probability 
(1-x1) a new receiver has not received the e-coupon before. 
This explains equation (2.1).  
15 If either h=0 or l=0, then e-coupons are not issued, or 
equivalently, the manufacturer has chosen to ignore the 
presence of Internet.  
consumer awareness. However, we argue that K0 and K (the 
cost parameters) tend to be prohibitively high so that this 
will not be feasible. The main problem here is that, unlike 
the e-coupon forwarded by one’s associate, the regular 
coupon may simply be ignored because it does not come 
from someone the receiver trusts as an opinion leader. With 
this simplifying assumption, it follows that the manufacturer 
can only make the regular coupon accessible to the aware 
consumers. 16  We shall assume that in so doing the 
manufacturer incurs a fixed cost F³0, and hence the 
manufacturer’s only relevant decisions concerning the 
regular coupon are whether to spend the cost F, and to 
determine the face value r for the regular coupon.  
 
After the manufacturer chooses his regular coupon strategy, 
consumers must decide whether or not to acquire the coupon, 
and once they have it, whether to retain (carry) it for later 
redemption. Because the carrying costs are fixed costs, 
consumers who have carried the e-coupon necessarily will 
carry the regular coupon. Finally, at the last stage of the 
game, consumers arrive at the manufacturer’s store on the 
shopping day, and they purchase the product and redeem the 
coupons. 
 
To begin, we make several simplifying assumptions.  
 
Assumption 1  
Forwarding of the e-coupon is perfect; that is, n=¥.  
 
Assumption 2  
V-A-C³ v-c.  
 
Assumption 3 
In the absence of the Internet, the manufacturer prefers 
issuing a regular coupon and serving all consumers to not 
                                                 
16 For example, the manufacturer may attach the regular 
coupon to newspapers, or place the regular coupon in his 
store. We are assuming that the regular coupon so issued 
never catches the eyes of the unaware consumers. To raise 
consumer awareness in the absence of the Internet, the 
manufacturer must resort to other means like advertising.  
Chyi-Mei Chen, Shan-Yu Chou, Yu -Hsiu Chiou, and Eric Wu  
The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001.   
issuing a regular coupon. That is, min(p[a(A+C)-c], 
p[(v-c )-a(V-A-C)]) ³F.  
 
Assumption 1 is an idealization. In subsection 3.4 we 
discuss the case where n<¥. The last inequality in 
assumption 2 ensures that when both the acquisition costs 
and the carrying costs are present, the optimal screening 
coupon will have a face value equal to the highs’ redemption 
costs; see Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] for a proof. 
Assumption 3 is made so that our results can be compared to 
those in Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4]. It says that 
without the Internet, the segment of lows is important 
enough so that the manufacturer would like to issue a regular 
coupon and serve both the highs and the lows (i.e. 
 p[(v-c)+a(A+C)]-F ³ paV), and that the cost of running the 
regular coupon is low enough so that using the regular 
coupon to extract the highs’ consumer surplus is a good idea 
(i.e. p[a(A+C)-c]³F).  
 
Lemma 2.1   If an e-coupon is issued by the manufacturer,  
and is forwarded by the initial receivers, then on the 
shopping day the population of aware consumers is one.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2.1:  We must show that xn in equation 
(2.1) converges to 1 when n tends to infinity. First observe 
that the sequence { xn } is increasing and bounded above, 
which must have a limit. Repeatedly using (1), we have  
 
(xn-xn-1)=(x1-x0)(1-x1)(1-x2) … ( 1 -xn-1).      (2.2) 
 
Since the left -hand side of (2.2) converges to zero as n tends 
to infinity, we conclude that xn-1 must converge to one.  
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2.2   Maintain assumptions 1-3. Suppose that an 
e-coupon has been issued, and all the e-coupon receivers 
forward it to their associates. Then the e-coupon enhances 
the manufacturer’s incentives to subsequently run a regular 
coupon and serve all consumers.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Following lemma 2.1, at the time the 
manufacturer determines his optimal regular coupon strategy, 
the population of aware consumers will be 1. From 
assumption 3, the manufacturer will run a regular coupon 
and serve all consumers after an e-coupon is issued if and 
only if min(a(A+C),   [v’-a(V’-A-C)]) ³F, where v’ and V’ 
stand for the lows’ and the highs’ valuations for the product 
given that the e-coupon has been issued. There are two 
possibilities: Either all consumers have the e-coupon, or 
only the lows have the e-coupon. In both cases, we have  
 
[v’-a(V’ -A-C)]) ³[v-a(V-A-C)]) ³F,        (2.3) 
 
and hence our assertion follows.    Q.E.D.  
 
 
3. THE OPTIMALCOUPON STRATEGY: TWO 
POLAR CASES  
 
In this section we shall focus on two polar cases, the case 
where consumers’ redemption costs differ mainly because 
they have different acquisition costs, and the case where the 
differences are mainly due to differences in the carrying 
costs. These polar cases best demonstrate our argument that 
e-coupons and regular coupons perform essentially different 
functions, and the intuition we obtain by inspecting these 
polar cases stands valid for the general case, which we shall 
analyze in section 4.  
 
3.1. The Case of C=c=0.  
 
In this subsection we assume that consumers’ redemption 
costs for a coupon consist of acquisition costs only. 
Although the high-valuation and low-valuation consumers 
differ in the acquisition costs for a regular coupon, as far as 
e-coupons are concerned, they have identical redemption 
costs (which are zero following the assumption C=c=0). In 
this case whenever an e-coupon is issued, all receivers will 
redeem it. The message we are trying to deliver here is that, 
e-coupons may be very useful for raising the overall 
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consumer awareness, but unlike regular coupons, they may 
not serve the purpose of screening well. This is true 
especially when consumers’ redemption costs for coupons 
consist mainly on acquisition costs. This observation 
underlies our argument that e-coupons and regular coupons 
have fundamentally different functions.  
 
Lemma 3.1 Maintain assumptions 1-3. Suppose that 
 
kl0 < (1-p)(v+aA).                   (3.1) 
 
Then the optimal e-coupon is such that h³d and l=l0. All 
consumers receive and redeem the e-coupon in equilibrium. 
The optimal regular coupon is such that r=A. In equilibrium 
only low-valuation consumers acquire and redeem the 
regular coupon. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3.1 : Since consumers have identical 
redemption costs for the e-coupon, the e-coupon, if issued, 
must be purely advertising. The manufacturer can either 
ignore e-coupons, or issue an e-coupon to l0 consumers, or 
issue an e-coupon to all consumers. (The manufacturer’s 
profit is linear in the population of the consumers initially 
reached by the e-coupon, and hence we confine our attention 
to the corner solutions.) Note that these alternatives affect 
the subsequent regular coupon design only via (1) changes 
in consumers’ valuations for the product and (2) the 
determination of the population of aware consumers. Note 
also that the optimal regular coupon, if issued, must be 
independent of the population of aware consumers. Now 
assumptions 1-3 and the condition kl0 < (1-p)(v+aA) ensure 
that the regular coupon will be issued, and since the 
e-coupon strategy has nothing to do with the acquisition 
costs for the regular coupon, the optimal regular coupon is 
independent of the e-coupon strategy. It follows from 
Gerstner and Hess (1991)[3] that the optimal regular coupon 
is such that r=A, which only the low-valuation consumers 
will redeem. Since the e-coupon strategy has no bearing on 
the subsequent regular coupon strategy, it follows from kl0 
< (1-p)(v+aA) again that issuing an e-coupon which all 
receivers will redeem to l0 consumers is optimal.         
Q.E.D.  
 
Note that the left-hand side in (3.1) represents the least cost 
the manufacturer must incur in order to obtain free 
forwarding of the e-coupon. When equation (3.1) fails, the 
manufacturer will simply ignore the presence of the Internet, 
and his behavior is as described in Gerstner and Hess (1991, 
1995)[3][4]. Equipped with the preceding lemmas, we are 
ready to express:  
 
Proposition 3.1  Maintain assumptions 1-3. If kl0 < 
(1-p)(v+aA), the manufacturer’s optimal coupon strategy is 
to first issue an e-coupon (h³d, l=l0 ) at a cost kl0 and then 
issue a regular coupon r=A at a cost F. The corresponding 
product price is p=v+A+d. The manufacturer’s equilibrium 
profit is v+aA-F-kl0. If kl0 > (1-p)(v+aA), the 
manufacturer’s optimal coupon strategy is simply ignoring 
the presence of the Internet, and issuing the regular coupon 
(r=A) at a cost F. The corresponding product price is p=v+A 
and the manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is p (v+aA)-F. 
 
Proposition 3.1 shows a full separability between e-coupons 
and regular coupons: E-coupons are first issued to raise 
consumer awareness, and then regular coupons are used to 
price discriminate consumers. This result is consistent with 
Gerstner and Hess (1991, 1995)[3][4] and the findings of 
Kuchinskas and Susan (1999)[8]. The latter paper points out 
that online advertising is especially useful in increasing 
brand awareness.  
 
3.2. The Case A=0, c=0 and d<(1-a)C. 
 
In this and the next subsections, we assume that consumers 
incur no search costs for coupons. The entire redemption 
costs originate from the carrying costs. Since we have 
assumed that the carrying costs are fixed costs, a rational 
consumer will carry either both the e-coupon and the regular 
coupon or neither of them. Unlike in subsection 3.1 where 
an e-coupon can never serve the purpose of screening, 
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Proposition 3.2 below shows that in the current case an 
e-coupon can assume the dual roles of advertising and 
screening, as long as l0 is small and a condition on the 
composition of high-valuation and low-valuation consumers 
is satisfied.  
 
Proposition 3.2  Maintain assumptions 1-3.   
1. If kl0 <(1-p)(v+aC)+F, the manufacturer’s optimal 
coupon strategy is to issue just one e-coupon 
(h=C,l=l0), which only the lows will redeem but all 
receivers will forward to their associates. The 
corresponding product price is p=v+C and the 
manufacturer’s profit is v+aC-kl0. 
2. If kl0 >(1-p)(v+aC)+F, the manufacturer’s optimal 
coupon strategy is to ignore the Internet and to issue a 
regular coupon (r=C). The corresponding product 
price is p=v+C. In equilibrium the manufacturer’s 
profit is p(v+aC)-F. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: Consider the case where kl0 
<(1-p)(v+aC)+F. It is apparently better for the manufacturer 
to issue an e-coupon that induces forwarding than one that 
does not. The condition d< (1-a)C, however,  says that even 
if h=C so that only low-valuation consumers may redeem 
the e-coupon, an e-coupon receiver still finds it optimal to 
forward the e-coupon to his associate. Given n=¥, lemma 
2.1 ensures that all consumers will become aware of the 
product by the time the manufacturer chooses his optimal 
regular coupon strategy. The regular coupon, if it were 
issued, would have a face value r=C. This proves that the 
e-coupon (h=C, l= l0) is indeed optimal, since it spares the 
cost F of issuing another regular coupon with the same face 
value. The case where kl0 >(1-p)(v+aC)+F is 
straightforward.  Q.E.D.  
 
Proposition 3.2 can be understood as follows. For an 
e-coupon to be promotional (to perform the function of 
screening), it must allow only low-valuation consumers to 
redeem, but this may run the risk of discouraging the early 
receivers from forwarding the e-coupon to their associates. 
The latter problem would disappear, if an e-coupon receiver 
thinks that his associate is probably a low-valuation 
consumer, or if that is not very likely, the e-coupon has a 
high face value. This is the meaning of the condition d< 
(1-a)C.   
 
3.3. The Case A=0 and d³ (1-a)C. 
 
In this case the e-coupon cannot serve the dual functions of 
free advertising and price discrimination: It is not possible to 
issue an e-coupon carried and redeemed only by the 
low-valuation consumers while forwarded by all receivers. 
There are three possibilities for an e-coupon: (1) no one 
redeems and forwards it; (2) the lows will redeem it but no 
one forwards it; and (3) all consumers will redeem and 
forward it.  
 
Proposition 3.3  Maintain assumptions 1-3.  
1. If aC<k(1-l0), kl0<(1-p)v -paC+F, the manufacturer’s 
optimal coupon strategy is to issue an e-coupon 
(h>max(d+aC+(1-a)c, C), l=l0 ) at a cost kl0 that all 
consumers will redeem and forward. The 
corresponding product price is p=v+h. The 
manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is v-kl0.  
2. If aC>k(1-l0), k< (1-p)v+(a-p)C, the manufacturer’s 
optimal coupon strategy is to issue an e-coupon  
(h=C, l=1) that only the lows will redeem but no one 
forwards. The corresponding product price is p=v+C. 
The manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is v+aC-k. 
3. If kl0 > (1-p)v-paC+F, and k > (1-p)v+(a-p)C, the 
manufacturer’s optimal coupon strategy is to ignore 
the Internet and to issue a regular coupon (r=C). The 
corresponding product price is p=v+C. In equilibrium 
the manufacturer’s profit is p(v+aC)-F. 
 
The condition d³ (1-a)C says that an e-coupon receiver 
would not forward the coupon to his associate unless the 
face value of the e-coupon is so high that even a 
high-valuation associate would like to retain and redeem that 
coupon. Consequently, given the parameter d, if the 
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manufacturer wishes consumers to forward the e-coupon, the 
face value of the e-coupon in Proposition 3.3 must be a lot 
higher than that in Proposition 3.1. Proposition 3.3 points 
out that the manufacturer can issue e-coupons to all online 
users if the issuing cost is small,17 and as before, if k orl0 
are not small, the manufacturer will ignore the Internet and 
issue a promotional regular coupon. 
 
3.4  Discussions  
 
In this subsection, we briefly go over assumptions 1-3 and 
discuss their relationships with the above obtained results. 
First, we claim that issuing an e-coupon that nobody wants 
to redeem may be optimal if low-valuation consumers have 
strictly positive carrying costs (i.e. c>0). The idea is that, to 
induce forwarding, an e-coupon must at least be retained and 
redeemed by low-valuation consumers, but that can be 
costly if the latter also have strictly positive carrying costs. 
This is true in particular when k is very small, for in that 
case to raise the overall consumer awareness the 
manufacturer can cheaply issue an e-coupon that will never 
be forwarded. Essentially, when k is small, issuing an 
e-coupon that will never be forwarded is just like sending a 
catalog. Of course the problem here is that such an e-coupon 
may not be very effective in creating awareness, since it 
delivers a message without a reward; see Hassell (1999). 
Taking the above discussions and propositions 3.1-3.3 
together, we have the following testable implication 
regarding the redemption rates of regular and e-coupons.  
 
Corollary 3.1   Regular coupons tend to have more stable 
redemption rates than e-coupons.  
 
As our theory shows, an optimal regular coupon is always 
promotional, in the sense that it induces the lows to redeem 
but not the highs. The redemption rate, defined as the ratio 
of the number coupons redeemed to the sales volume, is 
always 1-a>0 in our model. The redemption rate for an 
                                                 
17 That is, k < aC /(1-l0). 
e-coupon, however, can be zero, 1-a>0, or one, depending 
on whether or not the lows have non-zero carrying costs, and 
whether it is too costly to have e-coupons play the 
promotional role.  
 
Next, we show that there are profound effects of allowing n 
< ¥. Note that with imperfect forwarding the manufacturer 
has to face four segments of consumers in general: the highs 
with the e-coupon, the lows with the e-coupon, the highs 
without the e-coupon, and the lows without the e-coupon. 
More precisely, after the issuance of a purely advertising 
e-coupon with face value h, these four groups of consumers’ 
valuations for the product are respectively V+h-C, v+h, V, 
and v. Depending on whether or not v+h³ V, the 
manufacturer’s subsequent decisions for the regular coupon 
and the transaction price will be different. Take case 1 for 
example. With the advertising e-coupon specified in 
Proposition 3.1, if V³v+d then low-valuation consumers still 
have a lower valuation than high-valuation consumers, no 
matter whether they have the e-coupon or not; but if instead 
v+d> V, then the ranking will be reversed. In any case, 
proposition 3.4 documents an inverse relationship between 
the number of e-coupons and the number of regular coupons 
issued under the condition n<¥, which is consistent with the 
findings of Liebeskind (2000)[10].   
 
Proposition 3.4  Suppose that n<¥, but maintain 
assumptions 2 and 3. The issuance of e-coupons tends to 
discourage the manufacturer from issuing regular coupons. 
 
Proposition 3.4 renders another testable prediction regarding 
the relationship between regular and e-coupons. To see that 
proposition 3.4 is true, note that by the stated assumptions 
the manufacturer would issue one regular coupon and 
optimally serve all consumers in the absence of Internet. In 
the presence of Internet, when p,k, and l0 are small, the 
manufacturer would optimally issue an e-coupon to enlarge 
the population of aware consumers, but as we mentioned 
above, this would also change the composition of consumers. 
In particular, the presence of consumers with e-coupons will 
Chyi-Mei Chen, Shan-Yu Chou, Yu -Hsiu Chiou, and Eric Wu  
The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001.   
induce the manufacturer to abandon the low-valuation 
consumers without e-coupons. This together with the 
following fact implies that the benefits of regular coupons 
are diminished, or equivalently, the manufacturer should 
optimally use less regular coupons: Consumers with the 
e-coupon tend to have higher valuations for the product, and 
give that the redemption costs are mainly fixed costs, these 
people essentially have lower marginal redemption costs for 
the regular coupon, which makes a regular coupon less 
likely to be promotional. Thus the issuance of e-coupons 
reduces the manufacturer’s incentives of issuing regular 
coupons, when the forwarding effect of the e-coupons is less 
than perfect.  
 
Another effect of allowing n<¥ is that, when k is very small, 
the manufacturer may find it optimal to issue e-coupons that 
will never be forwarded by the initial receivers. This result 
looks the same as in the case where low-valuation 
consumers have strictly positive carrying costs, but it 
happens for a different reason. Similar to that case, here 
issuing an e-coupon to get free advertisements can be costly 
to the manufacturer, and the cost is that it may reduce the 
benefits of promotional regular coupons. Thus the 
manufacturer must balance his  concerns of getting free 
advertising by issuing  an e-coupon with imperfect 
forwarding effect and the forfeited promotional benefits that 
would otherwise be available from the subsequently issued 
regular coupon.  
 
These results show that there is an inverse relationship 
between the number of e-coupons and the number of regular 
coupons issued. This inverse relationship is consistent with 
the findings of Liebeskind (2000), where a migration from 
regular coupons to e-coupons is documented.  
 
Finally, it should be emphasized (although clear) that our 
results stand valid whether or not the distribution channel is 
vertically integrated, as long as n=¥. To the extent that n=¥ 
is a good approximation to the reality, our results show that, 
in a sense of separability,  e-coupons can first be used to 
enlarge the population of aware consumers, and then regular 
coupons can be used to price discriminate consumers and to 
alleviate downstream channel members’ incentive 
problems.18 However, in case n=¥ is a poor approximation 
to the reality, e-coupons may interfere not only with the 
manufacturer’s incentives of using regular coupons (as 
mentioned above), but also with an independent dealer’s 
incentives of taking a targeting strategy that lowers the 
channel profits. We record this finding as proposition 3.5.  
 
Proposition 3.5  Suppose that n<¥, but maintain 
assumptions 2 and 3. Suppose also that, besides the 
manufacturer, the distribution channel has another member, 
an independent retailer. Suppose that both the manufacturer 
and the retailer are confined to use linear pricing policies so 
that a miscoordination problem is present. The issuance of 
e-coupons may enhance consumer awareness on the one 
hand, but it may aggravate the miscoordination problem on 
the other hand.  
 
For a detailed discussion of the miscoordination problem in 
a distribution channel with independent dealers, see Gerstner 
and Hess (1995)[4]. As we mentioned earlier, the issuance of 
purely advertising e-coupons may change the composition of 
consumers facing the retailer, and in fact the presence of 
consumers with e-coupons encourages the retailer to 
abandon the low-valuation consumers without e-coupons. It 
follows that with the e-coupons, the manufacturer must 
provide more trade promotions and the retailer may enjoy a 
higher rent in equilibrium (part of this rent, of course, stems 




4. THE OPTIMAL COUPON STRATEGY: THE 
GENERAL CASE
                                                 
18 Recall that in subsection 3.2, the optimal e-coupon also 
performs the function of a screening regular coupon, and 
hence it helps to alleviate channel members’ incentive 
problems.  
Chyi-Mei Chen, Shan-Yu Chou, Yu -Hsiu Chiou, and Eric Wu  
The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001.   
 
Table 1: 10 feasible coupon strategies in the presence of the Internet. 
 
Strategy Category   Feasible Strategies 
Category I:  
Issuing neither regular coupon 
nor e-coupon 
S1 No coupon is issued. 
Category II: 
Issuing a regular coupon 
S2 Issuing the regular coupon that only low-valuation consumers 
will redeem. 
S3 Issuing the e-coupon that no one will redeem and forward. 
S4 Issuing the e-coupon that only low-valuation consumers will 
redeem but no one will forward. 
S5 Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers forward and only 
low-valuation consumers will redeem. 
Category III:  
Issuing an e-coupon only 
S6 Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers will redeem and 
forward. 
S7 Issuing the e-coupon that no one will redeem and forward, and 
then issuing the regular coupon that only low-valuation 
consumers will redeem. 
S8 Issuing the e-coupon that only low-valuation consumers will 
redeem but no one will forward, and then issuing the regular 
coupon that only low- valuation consumers redeem. 
S9 Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers forward and only 
low-valuation consumers will redeem, and then issuing the 
regular that only low-valuation consumers will redeem. 
Category VI:  
Issuing a regular coupon and 
an e-coupon 
S10 Issuing the e-coupon that all consumers will redeem and 
forward, and then issuing the regular that only low-valuation 
consumers will redeem. 
 
 
In section 3, we discussed two polar cases to highlight the 
different roles the e-coupon and the regular coupon may play. 
In this section we will extend the model to the general case 
where neither acquiring nor carrying a regular coupon is 
costless for high valuation consumers; that is C >0 and A>0; 
also, the carrying cost for e-coupons is the same as that for 
regular coupons, which is equal to c for low-valuation 
consumers and C for high-valuation consumers. All other 
assumptions remain the same. We shall still focus on the 
case where n=?. In the following, we shall first consider 
the manufacturer’s feasible coupon strategies and then solve 
each of them to derive the associated best coupon strategy. 
Finally, we characterize the optimal coupon strategy for the 
manufacturer through three propositions.  
 
4.1 The Ten Feasible Coupon Strategies 
 
When consumers differ not only in their carrying costs but 
also in their acquisition costs for coupons, as will be shown, 
the manufacturer may employ both e-coupons and regular 
coupons to price discriminate against high-valuation 
consumers. As mentioned before, in the first stage, the 
manufacturer posts the product price and chooses its 
e-coupon strategy, including the face value ç of the 
e-coupon, and the fraction ë of consumers who will be 
reached by the e-coupon initially. Given the choice of ç and 
ë by the manufacturer, consumers decide whether to retain it 
for later redemption, whether to forward it to their associates. 
In terms of strategy outcome, the manufacturer’s e-coupon 
strategies can be classified into the following five ones: (1) 
not issuing an e-coupon; (2) issuing an e-coupon which no 
one will redeem and forward; (3) issuing an e-coupon which 
no one will forward while the low-valuation receivers will 
redeem; (4) issuing an e-coupon which all receivers forward 
and only low-valuation receivers will redeem; (5) issuing an 
e-coupon which all receivers will forward and redeem. 
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Given its e-coupon s trategy chosen in the previous stage, the 
manufacturer decides whether to issue a regular coupon, and 
the face value of the regular coupon. Two resulting strategies 
are available for the manufacturer: not issuing a regular 
coupon, and issuing a regular coupon that only 
low-valuation consumers will redeem. 19 Combining the five 
e-coupon strategies and two regular coupon strategies, we 
summarize all of the manufacturer’s strategies in table 1.  
 
Before the emergence of the Internet, the manufacturer only 
has two feasible coupon strategies (S1 and S2). We shall first 
characterize the manufacturer’s optimal regular coupon 
strategy in the absence of the Internet, and then proceed to 
analyze the other eight strategies, which become feasible 
only after the emergence of the Internet. 
 
4.2 The Optimal Coupon Strategy without the Internet 
 
In the absence of the Internet, only regular coupons are 
feasible, and the population of aware consumers is 
predetermined as p. The manufacturer can either issue no 
regular coupons or issue a regular coupon that is to be 
redeemed by the low-valuation consumers. Assumption 3 
ensures that the manufacturer prefers issuing a regular 
coupon and serving all aware consumers to issuing no 
regular coupon or serving the high-valuation consumers only. 
The following lemma reports the equilibrium coupon 
strategy before the emergence of the Internet.  
 
Lemma 4.1  Maintain assumptions 1,2 and assume 
min(p[a(A+C)-c],   p[(v-c )-a(V-A-C)]) ³ F. In the absence of 
the Internet, the manufacturer will issue the regular coupon 
(ñ=A+C) that only the low-valuation consumers will redeem. 
The corresponding product price is p=v+A+C-c and the 
manufacturer’s equilibrium profit is ð[v-c+a(A+C)] -F. 
 
                                                 
19 It is obvious that it is not feasible in our model for the 
manufacturer to issue a regular coupon redeemed only by 
the high-valuation consumers. Also, it is not optimal to issue 
Lemma 4.1 shows that in the general model where A³0 and 
C ³c³0, the manufacturer can price discriminate against 
high-valuation consumers both through their higher 
acquisition costs and through their higher carrying cost for 
regular coupons. In contrast, all consumers incur the same 
cost (assumed to be zero) when acquiring e-coupons. 
Therefore, in terms of price discrimination, regular coupons 
can do a better job than e-coupons. In the following, we will 
consider the role of e-coupons in the presence of the Internet 
and explore whether and when the regular coupon will be 
replaced by the e-coupon. 
 
4.3 In the presence of the Internet 
 
In this section, we will analyze all feasible coupon strategies 
in the presence of the Internet. According to Lemma 4.1, the 
manufacturer prefers issuing the regular coupon in the 
absence of the Internet; i.e., S2 is preferred to S1. Moreover, 
after the emergence of the Internet, the manufacturer prefers 
S7 to S3. It happens because in both strategies, the 
manufacturer issues the e-coupon that no one will redeem 
and thus the use of the e-coupon does not change 
consumers’ willingness to pay but expands the market of 
aware consumers; Since in the absence of the Internet it pays 
for the manufacturer to price discriminate consumers 
through regular coupons (Lemma 4.1), there is no way for 
the manufacturer to give up the opportunity of further price 
discrimination through a regular coupon given that the 
market of aware consumers has been expanded by a 
e-coupon. Therefore, by eliminating S1 and S3, w e  can 
focus on the remaining seven coupon strategies in addition 
to S2, which were classified in table 1 into two categories 
(e-coupon only and both coupons) and will be analyzed 
below. 
 
4.3.1 E-coupons only 
 
The first strategy in this category is issuing the e-coupon that 
only low-valuation consumers to redeem but no one 
                                                                                   
a regular coupon redeemed by all consumers.  
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forwards (S4). As far as e-coupons are concerned, 
consumers’ acquisition costs are zero, and their redemption 
costs are exactly the carrying cost. In this case, it is obvious 
that the face value of the e-coupon should be set between the 
high-valuation consumers’ and the low-valuation 
consumers’ carrying cost, i.e., C?ç?c. Moreover, the face 
value of the e-coupon is such that no one will forward it, i.e., 
d?(1–a)(ç–c). In this strategy, the manufacturer will send 
an e-coupon to a fraction ë of consumers by email, and thus 
there will be ð+(1-ð)ë of all consumers who are aware of the 
product. Hence, the optimal ë, price and face value in this 
strategy are ë=1, p=v+çu-c, ç=çu = min{C, c+d/(1-a)} and 
the corresponding profit is 20  
 
Ð(S4)=v-c+açu-k.                 (4.1) 
 
Here, the e-coupon performs the dual roles of advertising 
and promotion. 
 
The second strategy is to issue only the e-coupon that the 
lows will redeem and all consumers will forward (S5). 
Therefore, the e-coupon is designed such that C?ç?c and 
d?(1–a)(ç–c).21 In this case, the optimal ë will be set at ë0 
to take advantage of free advertising by consumers. This 
perfect forwarding will induce all consumers become aware 
of the product, i.e., the proportion of aware consumers will 
equal one. The optimal price and face value in this strategy 
are p=v+C-c, ç=C, and the corresponding profit is  
 
Ð(S5)=v-c+aC-kë0.                (4.2) 
 
Here, the e-coupon serves the dual functions of advertising 
and promotion. 
 
The third strategy is to issue the e-coupon that all consumers 
will redeem and forward (S6). Hence the face value of the 
e-coupon has to satisgy ç?C?c and d?a(ç–C)+(1–a)(ç–c). 
                                                 
20 ë=1 if (1-ð)(v-c)+(a-ð)çu -k?0.  
21 Combining these two conditions, we obtain C?ç?
d/(1-a)+c and d?(1–a)(C–c). 
Again, with n=?, the optimal ë will be minimum ë0, and the 
proportion of aware consumers will be one. The optimal 
price and face value in this strategy are p=v+ç -c, ç?max{C, 
d+aC+(1-a)c}, and the corresponding profit is  
 
Ð(S6)=v-c-kë0.                   (4.3) 
 
Here, the manufacturer issues the e-coupon only to raise 
awareness level of consumers without price discriminating 
them. 
 
Lemma 4.2  When the manufacturer issues the e-coupon 
only, the optimal e-coupon strategy is as follows: 
1. If d?(1-a)(C-c), k?
01 l-
aC
 and k?(1-ð)(v-c)+(a-ð)C, 
the optimal e-coupon strategy is such that ç=C, ë=1 
where no one will redeem and forward the e-coupon 
(i.e., S4) and the resulting profit is v-c+aC-k;  
2. If d < (1-a)(C-c), the optimal e-coupon strategy is such 
that ç=C, ë=ë0 where only low-valuation consumers 
will redeem while all consumers will forward it (i.e., S5) 
and the resulting profit is v-c+aC-kë0;  
3. If d?(1-a)(C-c) and k?
01 l-
aC
, the optimal e-coupon 
strategy is such that ç?max{C, d+aC+ (1-a)c} , ë=ë0 
where all consumers will redeem and forward the 
e-coupon (i.e., S6) and the resulting profit is v-c-kë0. 
 
The message sent from the above lemma is that when the 
forwarding cost d is too large (i.e., d? (1-a)(C-c)), the 
manufacturer can not induce consumers to forward the 
e-coupon without giving up the opportunity of price 
discrimination. As a result, depending on the magnitude of 
issuing cost k, the manufacturer either saves its issuing cost 
by giving up the benefits from price discrimination (i.e., S6), 
or price discriminates consumers by incurring the issuing 
cost k (i.e., S4). On the other hand, if the forwarding cost is 
small enough, it is preferable to let consumers forward the 
e-coupons free of charge. 
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4.3.2 Both coupons 
 
We now consider the coupon strategies in category IV where 
both coupons will be used. As far as the e-coupon is 
concerned, the optimal e-coupon strategy is the same as 
before. The only difference is that in addition to the 
e-coupon, the manufacturer will issue the regular coupon 
that only the low-valuation consumers will redeem. 
Therefore, we will only illustrate the analysis of strategy S7. 
For all other three strategies, we will just report the 
associated profits. 
 
The first strategy is to issue the e-coupon that no one 
redeems and no one forwards, and a regular coupon 
redeemed by only the low-valuation consumers (i.e., S7). In 
this case, it is obvious that the face value of the e-coupon is 
smaller than the low-valuation consumers’ carrying cost 
such that no one will redeem and will forward, i.e., C?c?ç
? 0. Because no one carries the e-coupon for later 
redemption, the high-valuation consumers’ and the 
low-valuation consumers’ carrying costs for the regular 
coupon are still C and c respectively. Hence the 
high-valuation consumers’ total redemption cost of the 
regular coupon is A+C, and the low-valuation consumers’ is 
c.22 Therefore the face value of the regular coupon has to 
satisfy A+C?ñ?c. Because consumers will not forward the 
e-coupon, the manufacturer still sends e-coupons to a 
fraction ë of consumers by email, thus having proportion 
ð+(1-ð)ë of all consumers aware of the product. The optimal 
ë, price and face values of two coupons in this strategy are 
ë=1, p=v-c+A+C, ç=0, ñ=A+C, and the corresponding profit 
is23 
 
Ð(S7)=v-c+a(A+C)-k-F.             (4.4) 
 
This strategy shows distinct functions served by e-coupons 
and regular coupons: E-coupons are issued to enlarge the 
                                                 
22 Remember that the acquisition cost of e-coupons is zero, 
the low-valuation consumers’ acquisition cost of the regular 
coupon also is zero and the high-valuation consumers’ is A. 
population of aware consumers, and regular coupons are 
then used to price discriminate aware consumers. 
 
The second strategy is to issue an e-coupon that only the 
low-valuation consumers will redeem but no one will 
forward, and a regular coupon redeemed by only the 
low-valuation consumers (S8). In this case, the optimal ë, 
price and face values of two coupons in this strategy are ë=1, 
p=v+çu+A-c, where çu= min{C, c+d/(1-a)}, and ñ=A, and 
the corresponding profit is 24  
 
Ð(S8)=v-c+a(A+çu)-k-F.             (4.5) 
 
In this situation, the e-coupon performs the dual roles of 
advertising and promotion, and the regular coupon also 
performs the role of promotion. 
 
The third strategy is to issue an e-coupon that only the 
low-valuation consumers will redeem and all consumers will 
forward, and a regular coupon redeemed by only the 
low-valuation consumers (S9). In this case, the optimal price 
and face values of two coupons in this strategy are 
p=v-c+A+C, ç=C, ñ=A, and the corresponding profit is  
 
Ð(S9)=v-c+a(A+C)-kë0-F.              (4.6) 
 
In this situation, the e-coupon performs the dual roles of 
advertising and promotion, and the regular coupon also 
performs the function of promotion. 
 
The fourth strategy is to issue an e-coupon that all 
consumers will redeem and forward, and a regular coupon 
redeemed by only the low-valuation consumers (S10). In 
this case, the optimal price and face values of two coupons 
are p=v-c+ç+A, ç?max{C, d+aC+(1-a)c}, ñ=A, and the 
corresponding profit is  
 
Ð(S10)=v-c+aA-kë0-F.                 (4.7) 
                                                                                   
23 Note that the optimal ë=1 if (1-ð)(v-c+a(A+C))?k.  
24 Note that the optimal ë=1 if (1-ð)(v-c+aA)+(a -ð)çu?k. 
Chyi-Mei Chen, Shan-Yu Chou, Yu -Hsiu Chiou, and Eric Wu  
The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong Kong, December 19-21, 2001.   
 
This strategy also shows that e-coupons and regular coupons 
play completely distinct role: the E-coupon is issued to 
enlarge the population of aware consumers, and the regular 
coupon is then used to price discriminate aware consumers. 
 
Lemma 4.3  If the manufacturer issues both coupons, as far 
as the latter three strategies (S8, S9, S10) are concerned, the 
optimal regular coupon strategy is such that ñ=A where only 
the low-valuation consumers will redeem, and the optimal 
e-coupon strategy is the same as described in lemma 4.2. 
The resulting profits are summarized as follows:  




(1-ð)(v-c+aA)+(a-ð)C, the optimal coupon strategy is 
S7 and S8, and the resulting profit is v-c+a(A+C)-k-F; 
2. If d < (1-a)(C-c), the optimal coupon strategy is S9 
and the resulting profit is v-c+a(A+C)-kë0-F;  
3. If d ? (1-a)(C-c) and k ?
01 l-
aC
, the optimal 
e-coupon strategy S10 and the resulting profit is 
v-c+aA-kë0-F 
 
Lemma 4.3 shows that, when e-coupon has been used, the 
regular coupon can still be used by the latter three strategies 
(S8-S10) to further price discriminate consumers through 
consumers’ variations in acquis ition cost for regular coupons. 
Whether it pays to do so depends on the issuing cost F 
relative to the benefits of price discrimination. 
 
Besides, we find that the profits of S7 and S8 are the same. 
It is because both strategies involve issuing two coupons, 
thus having the same issuing costs. Because both total face 
values are the same A+C, and only low-valuation consumers 
will redeem coupons, so their revenues are the same, too. 
Therefore, if d is large (d?(1-a)(C-c)) and k is small (k?
01 l-
aC
), the manufacturer can first issue an e-coupon which 
no one will redeem and forward, and then issue the regular 
coupon (i.e., S8), which results in the same profits as S7. In 
this strategy, the use of e-coupon is only serving the function 
of advertising. All consumers receive the message but no 
one redeems. The manufacturer price discriminates 
consumers only by the regular coupon with a large face 
value. 
 
4.4 The Equilibrium Coupon Strategy in the Presence of 
the Internet 
 
In the above three lemmas, we describe the coupon 
strategies for all feasible ones in the presence of the Internet. 
In the following, we will derive the corresponding 
conditions under which each strategy is indeed the 
equilibrium coupon strategy for the manufacturer. We shall 
summarize the results in the following three propositions. 
Proposition 1 is the equilibrium which the manufacturer only 
issues the regular coupon. Proposition 2 is the equilibrium 
which the manufacturer only issues  the e-coupon; i.e., after 
the emergence of the Internet, the regular coupon is 
completely replaced by the e-coupon. Proposition 4 is the 
equilibrium which the manufacturer issues both the 
e-coupon and the regular coupon, thus the e-coupons 
complement the use of regular coupons. 
 
Proposition 4.1 In the presence of the Internet, the optimal 
coupon strategy for the manufacturer is to issue the regular 
coupon where only the low-valuation consumers will 
redeem if one of the following sets of conditions holds: 
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The corresponding equilibrium price, ñ, and profit are 
respectively p=v, ñ=A+C, Ð(S2)=ð[v-c+a(A+C)]-F.  
 
Proposition 4.1 says that the higher ð is , the more likely that 
it is optimal for the manufacturer to issue the regular coupon 
only. The intuition is that if ð is  large, the marginal benefit 
of increasing aware consumers by using e-coupons is limited. 
On the other hand, the cost of using e-coupons weakly 
increases with the forwarding cost d. Consequently, if the 
forwarding cost d is high, it will be difficult for the 
manufacturer to induce forwarding, thus increasing the 
minimum ð for this e-coupon strategy to be optimal. 
Conversely, if d is small, it is easier to induce consumers to 
forward the e-coupon and do free advertising for the 
manufacturer, thus making the e-coupon strategy more 
attractive and increasing the required ð. 
 
Proposition 4.2 In the presence of the Internet, it is optimal 
for the manufacturer to issue the e-coupon only when one of 
the following sets of conditions holds. 
1. If  d?(1-a)(C-c), aA?F, k?
01 l-
aC
, and  
k£ (1-ð)(v-c)+(a-ð)C, the optimal coupon strategy is to 
issue the e-coupon that only low-valuation consumers 
will redeem but no one will forward. The corresponding 
equilibrium price, ç, and profit are respectively 
p=v+C-c, ç=C, Ð(S4)=v-c+aC-k. 








, the optimal coupon 
strategy is to issue the e-coupon that only low-valuation 
consumers will redeem and all consumers will forward. 
The corresponding equilibrium price, ç, and profit  are 
respectively p=v+C-c, ç=C, Ð(S5)=v-c+aC-kë0. 
3. If  d?(1-a)(C-c), aA?F, k?
01 l-
aC








, the optimal strategy is to issue 
the e-coupon only that all consumers will redeem and 
forward. The corresponding equilibriu m price, ç, and 
profit are respectively p=v+ç-c, ç ? max{C, 
d+aC+(1-a)c}, Ð(S6)=v-c-kë0. 
 
In contrast with proposition 4.1, proposition 4.2 shows that 
the e-coupon only strategy is optimal only when ð is small 
enough. Moreover, e-coupon strategy is optimal only when 
aA?F. It happens because when the manufacturer uses 
e-coupons to make all consumers aware of its product, it 
does not pay for the manufacturer to price discriminate 
consumers by incurring the cost of issuing the regular 
coupon if aA?F. 
 
When d is small (d < (1-a)(C-c)), the manufacturer will issue 
the e-coupon that not only allows the manufacturer to price 
discriminate consumers, but also induces all consumers to 
forward, thus doing free advertising for the manufacturer. As 
mentioned before, when d is too large, the manufacturer 
faces the trade-off between price discrimination and free 
advertising by consumers through forwarding e-coupons. 
When the issuing cost k is large, then the manufacturer will 
prefer saving the issuing cost by giving up the opportunity of 
price discrimination. Finally, the lower the forwarding cost, 
the higher awareness level is required for this e-coupon only 
strategy to be optimal. 
 
Proposition 4.3 It is optimal for the manufacturer to issue 
both coupons when one of the follo wing conditions holds. 
1. If d?(1-a)(C-c), aA?F, 
01 l-
aC
?k, and  
k?(1-ð)(v-c+aA)+(a-ð)C, the optimal coupon strategies 
are S7 or S8. Both of these two optimal price and profits 
are the same, p=v+A+C-c, Ð(S7,S8)=v-c+ a(A+C)-k-F. 
The face values for S7 are ç=0, ñ=A+C, while  those for 
S8 are ç=C, ñ=A. 








, the optimal coupon 
strategy is first to issue the e-coupon that only the 
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low-valuation consumers will redeem and all consumers 
will forward, and then to issue a regular coupon that 
only the low-valuation consumers will redeem (S9). The 
corresponding equilibrium price, face values, and profit 
are respectively p=v+A+C-c, ç=C, ñ=A, 
Ð(S9)=v-c+a(A+C)-kë0-F. 
3. If d?(1-a)(C-c), aA?F, k?
01 l-
aC








, the optimal strategy is first to 
issue an e-coupon which all consumers will redeem and 
forward, and then issue a regular coupon which only 
low-valuation consumers redeem (S10). The 
corresponding equilibrium price, face values, and profit 
are respectively p=v+A+ç-c, ç?max{C, d+aC+(1-a)c}, 
ñ=A, Ð(S10)= v-c+aA-kë0-F. 
 
In contrast with proposition 4.2, proposition 4.3 shows that 
the regular coupon will be used in addition to the e-coupon 
only when aA > F. That is, this strategy is optimal only when 
the benefit of price discrimination is large enough to justify 
the issuing cost F.  
 
If d is high, ð, k and F are small, the manufacturer will first 
issue the e-coupon that no one forwards and no one redeems, 
and then issue a regular coupon to screen aware consumers. 
This strategy is similar to the case C=c=0 in section 3 where 
price discrimination through e-coupons is not possible. 
However, when C > 0, the strategy S7 will not be dominated 
by the strategy S10 any more. The reason is that unlike the 
latter strategy, the former strategy reserves the opportunity 
of price discriminating consumers through their variations in 
carrying cost for coupons, thus obtaining an extra benefit aC.  
In this strategy, the e-coupon and the regular coupon 





From the above three propositions, we find that in this 
general model the regular coupon can be employed as a 
screening device both through consumers’ variations in the 
carrying cost and through those in the acquis ition cost for 
coupons. However, the role that the regular coupon plays is 
still limited to price discrimination while the e-coupon may 
serve both advertising and promotion purposes, depending 
on the structures of consumers’ redemption costs and the 
forwarding costs. If consumers’ redemption costs of 
e-coupons are the same, then the e-coupons can not be used 
to screen consumers. If consumers’ redemption costs of 
e-coupons are different, but the forwarding cost is high, it 
may happen that the manufacturer will optimal issue a 
higher face value of e-coupon to encourage all consumers to 
forward and redeem it at the expense of the benefit of 
screening. In contrast, if consumers’ redemption costs of 
e-coupons are different and the forwarding cost is small, the 
e-coupon will serve to play the promotion role as well. 
 
Next, we find whether to issue only the regular coupon 
depends on the initial awareness level and the magnitude of 
the forwarding cost. When ð is large, the benefit of 
increasing potential consumers through e-coupons is limited, 
and therefore it is more likely that the manufacturer prefers 
only issuing the regular coupon to issuing e-coupons only 
and to issuing both coupons. Furthermore, if the forwarding 
cost d is high, it will be difficult to induce forwarding, and 
thus the required awareness level ð for the 
regular-coupon-only strategy to be optimal will be smaller.  
 
Third, we find that whether the manufacturer will issue the 
e-coupon that will be forwarded by consumers depends on 
the issuing cost k and d. When d is small, the manufacturer 
will issue the e-coupon that will be forwarded by all 
consumers, thus enjoying the benefit of free advertising. 
When d is large, if k is small, the manufacturer prefers to 
issue e-coupons to all consumers directly. If k is large, 
inducing forwarding is optimal for the manufacturer.  
 
Finally, we find that when ð is not large enough but F is 
higher, the regular coupon will be replaced by the e-coupon. 
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However, when ð is not large enough and F is smaller, the 
manufacturer will issue two coupons. Thus the e-coupon 
will be used to complement the regular coupon. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this paper we have conducted an exploratory study of the 
functions of e-coupons and their interactions with regular 
coupons, and we have provided a characterization of the 
optimal combination of the two coupons for a monopolistic 
manufacturer. Our results, as mentioned in section 1, are 
found consistent with several recently documented empirical 
facts.  
 
The current study is admittedly imperfect. However, its 
major limitations can be lifted in further research along this 
line. First, for our purpose the current paper has focused on 
polar cases where either the acquisition costs or the carrying 
costs are absent. This can be easily improved upon, by 
allowing general redemption costs. Similarly, as we 
mentioned in section 3.4, allowing non-zero redemption 
costs for low-valuation consumers has important 
implications for the manufacturer’s coupon strategy, and its 
implications can be easily obtained.  
 
Second, the current paper has not allowed the manufacturer 
to explicitly design the duration of the e-coupons. As we 
mentioned in section 3.4, allowing n<¥ (imperfect 
forwarding) would significantly change the manufacturer’s 
optimal coupon strategy and his relationship with 
downstream channel members. Thus it will be promising to 
explicitly examine how the design of duration may alter the 
optimal face value of the e-coupon and the size of the 
initially reached consumers. This will be even more 
interesting, if the spreading-out of the e-coupon can be 
modeled as a stochastic process where the law of large 
numbers may not be needed.  
 
Third, the current paper has not allowed much heterogeneity 
among consumers. Consumers are mainly classified 
according to their valuations for the product, and depending 
on the classification, they are attached with different 
redemption costs. In particular, we have assumed that all 
consumers are equal in the ability of using email. It would 
be much more realistic to allow the presence of consumers 
who have no access to e-coupons, and hence even perfect 
forwarding will not result in the same composition of 
consumers for the manufacturer as without the Internet.  
 
Despite the above limitations, the paper has obtained useful 
insights for marketing researchers and professionals. The 
obtained propositions contain testable implications, in 
particular those statements about the face values and 





Before the emergence of the  Internet, the manufacturer must 
also decide whether to serve all consumers or the 
high-valuation consumers only, and his optimal profit in this 
case is equal to  
 
Ð(S1)= max{ðv, ðaV}.            (A.1) 
 
If the manufacturer decides to issue a regular coupon for the 
lows, then he seeks to 
r,p
Max  Ð =ð[p-(1-a)ñ]-F 
s.t. v+ñ-c-p?0,    
 V-p?0, 
 v+ñ-c-p?v-p,   
 V-p?V+ñ-A-C-p, 
 
The first two inequalities are the lows’ and the highs’ 
individual rationality constraints, and the last two their 
incentive compatibility constraints. The optimal product 
price and the face value of the regular coupon are 
respectively p=v+A+C-c and ñ=A+C. Correspondingly, the 
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manufacturer’s profit is  
 
Ð(S2)=ð[v-c+a(A+C)]-F.              (A.2) 
 
Comparing (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain the optimal coupon 
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